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Identifying, countering, and preventing operational obsolescence is a challenging 
but vital task for personnel involved in the design, acquisition, and support of military 
equipment.  In this thesis, I define the concept of operational obsolescence and show 
quantitative relationships between modernization funding timelines and operational 
obsolescence.   
Only if we truly understand obsolescence can the U.S. Army best combat its onset 
and effects.  I use example data from both legacy and current Army Aviation Systems to 
draw conclusions about the impacts of particular modernization timelines on the various 
forms of obsolescence that cause operational obsolescence.  I then make 
recommendations concerning the optimal modernization strategies for current and future 
aviation systems in order to facilitate the Army’s ability to field and sustain the most 
tactically and logistically superior weapon systems possible. 
Using first principles, I construct Life Models based on hazard functions for each 
of the different forms of obsolescence.  I then combine these models into an overall 
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Identifying, countering, and preventing operational obsolescence is a challenging 
but vital task for personnel involved in the design, acquisition, and support of military 
equipment.  In this thesis, I define the concept of operational obsolescence and describe 
quantitative relationships between modernization funding timelines and operational 
obsolescence. 
Operational obsolescence may be defined in simplest terms as the loss by a 
working system of its ability to perform its mission successfully and affordably.  My 
research indicates that there are eight major sub-types of obsolescence that affect weapon 
systems.  These sub-types and their individual definitions are: 
 
1.  Tactical  inability of a given system to adequately perform the         
tactical mission assigned to it; includes the characteristics 
of the system not meeting required doctrinal parameters. 
 
2.  Logistical  inability of a weapon system to be maintained and supported 
within time-, spare part, and manpower-feasibility constraints. 
 
3.  Economic  inability to maintain acceptable readiness levels due to      
increased costs as availability falls, making parts too  
expensive to retain in required quantities.  
 
4.  Functional  designed function is no longer necessary or adequate;        
includes the system being interoperable with other  
related systems. 
 
5.  Technological revolutionary changes in what we know how to make,       
how we employ systems, or what we have available  
in design and support cause fundamental obsolescence. 
 
6.  Political  use and support of weapon system becomes too hard        
to justify or the designed purpose becomes  
unacceptable on the world stage. 
 
7.  Mission Change weapon system meets other definitions but due to there     
being no follow-on alternative, we are forced to  
absorb high modernization costs and continue to use  
otherwise obsolete systems. 
 
 xvi
8.  Service Specific  varying missions and philosophies between            
Services cause a system to be obsolete for one  
Service while not so for another. 
 
Using first principles, I construct Life Models based on hazard functions for each 
of the different sub-types of obsolescence.  Each contributing sub-type is modeled as a 
two-parameter continuous distribution.  The distributions used are the Weibull, 
Lognormal, and Logistic.  I show plausible shapes for the hazard function of each sub-
type plotted against time, based on speculated parameters from historical examples of 
weapon systems that have fallen victim to a particular sub-type of obsolescence.   
The sub-type models are then combined into an overall model, using the idea of 
competing failure rates.  The hazard functions for each of the sub-types sum to give the 
overall hazard function for the weapon system.  This methodology requires that the 
components are statistically independent.  I make the necessary simplifying assumption 
that the sub-types are independent to display analytical techniques for my models.   
In order to make use of my thesis a data system must be constructed and 
published to estimate model parameters for various types of weapon systems and to 
continue the research begun in the production of this thesis.  U.S. Army Materiel Systems 
Analysis Activity (AMSAA) should develop a database of obsolescence data from 
approximately forty years of weapon system life cycle data, either historical data from 
legacy systems or data on current systems.  I recommend the use of historical data so that 
this process can be used in the near future. 
Once data are available and parameters are estimated for the models developed, 
these models will estimate the distribution and time to obsolescence for any weapon 
system under study, as well as the dominant and contributing sources for that 
obsolescence.   
I conclude from the information currently available, and based on my expert 
opinion, that we should make our initial attacks on the issue of logistical obsolescence, 
particularly as we field increasing technologically advanced systems that rely heavily on 
electronic components.   
 xvii
I recommend striving to develop a methodology that allows continuous 
refreshment of components over the life cycles of weapon systems through spares 
replacement, which can be continuously upgraded and modernized by our contractors.  
This gives both the Army and industry the most competitive and capable environment in 































Acquisition, Logistical Support, and Operational personnel charged with 
development and sustainment of war-fighting capabilities within the U.S. Army strive to 
avoid operational obsolescence of the systems for which they are responsible.  A large 
degree of effort is currently spent on assessing the impact of logistical obsolescence, 
particularly as it applies to small electronic components of complex systems.  Tactical 
and functional viability of current and emerging weapon systems receives significant 
attention from Project Managers (PM) and the testing community.  But there is much 
more to operational obsolescence than logistics and tactics.  To the best of my 
knowledge, operational obsolescence has never been fully defined, much less studied.  
The deeper we delve into the question of what constitutes operational obsolescence, the 
more complex it becomes.  Clearly, operational obsolescence could be defined to simply 
mean the loss by a working system of its ability to perform its mission successfully, and 
at acceptable cost.  But as we look closer at this issue, it becomes apparent that the 
reasons for this loss are many and varied.  Therefore, we must start by adequately 
defining the major factors influencing operational obsolescence.  We then examine how 
to identify the impending occurrence of each sub-type of obsolescence, and how to avoid 
or counter it. 
 
B. SCOPE 
What is the appropriate definition of the term “Operational Obsolescence” as it 
applies to U.S. Army Aviation systems?  For example, is an aircraft more likely to first 
become obsolete because it genuinely can no longer perform the tactical task for which it 
was designed, or a related task?  Or will it reach a point when it is obsolete because it is 
no longer either possible or economically feasible to maintain acceptable readiness levels 
due to logistical reasons?  Do technological advances, either friendly or enemy, make 
other systems so much more desirable that the original system should be divested?  Is it 
true that an aircraft is obsolete as soon as one of these types of obsolescence occurs?  Are 
these answers different for Attack aircraft versus Cargo or Utility aircraft?  In the next 
2 
chapter, I list and define the most pertinent of the various types of obsolescence that 
weigh on this problem, using well-known systems, both air and ground, as particular 
examples. 
There are many issues that must be addressed in an attempt to identify and combat 
operational obsolescence.  This thesis answers a number of them.  I have also included a 
comprehensive listing of what I consider the most important of the remaining issues in 
my recommendations for further study in Chapter V of this thesis.  I strongly recommend 
continued study into this critical area by subsequent researchers. 
The objectives of my thesis were to: 
1. Define operational obsolescence and its sub-types. 
2. Develop plausible models of the individual types of operational 
obsolescence, and combine these models into an overall model. 
3. Analyze the combined model to determine quantitative relationships 
between modernization and operational obsolescence. 
4. Draw conclusions from my analysis and make recommendations to avoid 
the onset and effects of operational obsolescence.   
 
C. PURPOSE 
According to the Project Manager’s Office for the Longbow Apache, the 
sponsoring agency for this thesis, operational obsolescence as an all-encompassing 
phenomenon has never been studied, analyzed or quantified.  I found no existing 
information on operational obsolescence during the literature-search phase of my 
research.  We currently have no quantifiable assessment of the impact of operational 
obsolescence on the war-fighting strategies and capabilities of our military forces.  This 
phenomenon has become increasingly important to both Congressional and Military 
Decision-makers who must gain maximum effect over weapon systems’ life cycles in the 
most economically-feasible manner.1  This thesis provides, for the first time, an 
analytical assessment of what operational obsolescence is, what its impacts are, and what 
the Army can do to best avoid or minimize these impacts.  Without this analytical effort, 
                                                 
1  LTC Patrick J. Garman, Project Manager, Longbow Apache, Program Executive 
Office, Aviation, Redstone Arsenal, AL, Personal Interviews, NOV-DEC 2002. 
3 
the Army will continue to use a best-guess, reactive approach to the design, acquisition, 
and support of current and near-term future weapon systems.   
The urgency for accurate information concerning the phenomenon of operational 
obsolescence is great.  This thesis provides initial insight into this troubling area.  Due to 
the lack of actual weapon system data to use in my models, it is not possible for me to 
solve the problem of operational obsolescence for any particular system.  The value of 
this thesis lies in showing how the problem of operational obsolescence can be solved, 













THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
5 
II. DEFINITIONS AND DISCUSSION 
A significant portion of the value of my thesis lies in the introduction and 
definition of the concept of operational obsolescence.  The selection and definition of the 
various sub-types of obsolescence that drive overall operational obsolescence are largely 
drawn from my experience and judgment and that of my primary thesis advisor, along 
with relevant information gained from available literature.  Sources other than my advisor 
and me will be specifically noted and credited, as applicable.  
 
A. TACTICAL OBSOLESCENCE 
 
1. Definition 
The first type of operational obsolescence is “Tactical Obsolescence.”  We define 
this term as the inability of a given system to adequately perform the tactical mission 
assigned to it and its crews.  This includes the characteristics of the system no longer 
meeting required doctrinal parameters for firepower, mobility, crew protection, etc. as 
applied to current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of the user.  These 
requirements often evolve as doctrine changes.  A good example of a system that 
succumbed to tactical obsolescence is the M113A2 Armored Personnel Carrier.   
2. Example 
The M113A22 is a 13-ton, tracked vehicle designed to transport Infantry soldiers 
rapidly over the battlefield while affording them protection from direct and indirect small 
arms and artillery fires.  When introduced in 1960, this concept was a huge tactical 
advancement for previously foot-bound Light Infantry soldiers who possessed high 
mobility but were restricted to a movement rate of only a few kilometers per hour and 
who were highly vulnerable to even the lightest of fires.  Infantrymen were now able to 
move as an entire small unit at tens of kilometers per hour and the vehicle would repel or 
absorb the impacts of some, but not all, previously lethal fire.   
                                                 
2 Jane’s Information Group, Limited, “Jane’s Armour and Artillery,” 22nd Edition, 




This vehicle served the U.S. Army well for many years, but today the U.S. Army 
considers it obsolete for the tactical purpose of serving as an Infantry Fighting Vehicle.  
The vehicle was first modernized from the M113 to the M113A1 in 1964, less than five 
years after initial fielding, due to power and safety concerns.  Fifteen years later the 
vehicle was modernized to the M113A2 configuration.  Within a total of twenty-three 
years the M113A2 was tactically obsolete because of the emerging tactical needs of the 
U.S. Army for Infantry Fighting Vehicles, due to firepower and mobility shortcomings.   
Although the vehicle can conceptually still be maintained to acceptable standards, it is 
obsolete because it cannot meet the operational requirements of current Infantry doctrine.  
Specifically, the vehicle does not possess a high-firepower weapon system that can be 
employed while under the armor protection of the carrier; soldiers onboard the M113A2 
cannot effectively employ their individual weapon-systems from inside the carrier; 
enemy munitions have advanced to the point where there are too many threat weapon 
which readily penetrate the vehicle’s armor; and the vehicle is loud, fuel inefficient, and 
its surfaces are easily detected.  Thus, the M113A2 can no longer perform its assigned, or 
a closely related mission, to acceptable tactical levels for the U.S. Army, although in 
modernized versions it continues to serve as a combat service support vehicle and 
continues to find roles within the armies of other nations. 
There are many other examples of major systems that have become tactically 
obsolete.  I use the M113A2 only as a representative of this class of obsolescence.  Due 
to the lack of accumulated data, there is no definitive mean time when weapon systems 
reach tactical obsolescence, but the value appears to be on the order of approximately 
fifteen to twenty years.  Note in this definition that tactical obsolescence may be reached 
due to advances in friendly doctrine, such as the requirement for mounted weapon 
systems and weapon fire, or due to enemy advances, such as improvements in munitions 
or detection capabilities. 
 
B. LOGISTICAL OBSOLESCENCE  
1. Definition 
A war-fighting system loses operational relevance whenever it cannot be 
maintained and supported in time-, spares, and manpower-feasible manners.  The 
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inability to meet mission parameters within these constraints we term as “Logistical 
Obsolescence.”  As any mechanical system ages, its components wear and break.  These 
components must either be repaired or replaced.  Most war-fighting systems have no 
civilian equivalent and are often designed for a specific military mission or purpose.  
Once the required number of systems is produced, production lines are shut down, often 
including the production of repair parts, or spares.  A number of problems may result.  
The required repair parts may become so hard to obtain that it is virtually impossible to 
maintain acceptable system-availability levels to make the system operationally relevant 
in war or crisis.  The components required to produce a particular repair part may no 
longer be available, at any price, due to the components themselves no longer being 
manufactured, or being superceded by more technologically advanced parts.  This issue is 
particularly pervasive in the arena of electronic components and computer processors, 
which comprise the majority of the subsystems on modern Army aircraft. 
2. Example 
The AH-64D Longbow Apache Attack Helicopter, first fielded in July 1998 to the 
1-227th Aviation Regiment(Attack), is comprised almost entirely of computerized 
assemblies and electronic components, assembled into collections of boxes of integrated 
circuit cards performing mutually supportive tasks.3 This is a significant difference from 
the largely mechanical systems of previous Army aircraft.  These boxes are collectively 
known as Line-Replaceable-Units (LRU) or Shop-Replaceable-Units (SRU), depending 
on whether the particular component is authorized for stockage and replacement at the 
level of the using operational unit or at higher echelon maintenance elements.  Although 
the Longbow Apache is a relatively young weapon system, due to its high dependence on 
electronic components and the rapid pace of technological advancement in the computer 
market, several of its LRU/SRUs cannot be sustained due to non-availability of the 
electronic parts required to repair or construct the boxes.4  These boxes must either be 
redesigned, at tremendous time and cost penalties, or known obsolete parts must be 
purchased in sufficient quantities to maintain repair stocks.  Either way, the aircraft, in its 
                                                 
3  Jane’s Information Group, Limited, “Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft,” 91st Edition, 
1340 Braddock Place, Suite 300, Alexandria, VA 22314-1651, USA, 2000-2001, pp. 462-
464. 
4  LTC Patrick J. Garman, Project Manager, Longbow Apache, Program Executive 
Office, Aviation, Redstone Arsenal, AL, Personal Interviews, NOV-DEC 2002. 
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current configuration, has reached the point of logistical obsolescence, at an age of less 
than five years.   
Analysis of available information shows that if we define a weapon system to be 
logistically obsolete when either we can no longer obtain applicable repair parts through 
existing supply channels due to them being superceded or the parts on the weapon system 
are one or more full generations behind available electronics capabilities, the point of 
logistical obsolescence can occur even before Initial Operational Capability (IOC) or 
shortly thereafter.5  According to Gordon Moore’s Law that has been used as a rule of 
thumb for the current lifespan of any generation of electronic parts, electronic parts get 
twice as fast and half as costly approximately every eighteen months.6  This rule has been 
observed to hold quite well for the last four decades, and it is believed that it will hold for 
at least the next two decades.  Thus, weapon systems that rely heavily on electronic 
components can expect to approach logistical obsolescence of one form or the other 
within six to eighteen months of final design and to be extensively affected within two 
generations of their components, or three years, of fielding, unless there is significant 
modernization of components. 
 
C. ECONOMIC OBSOLESCENCE  
1. Definition 
Another, closely related, type of operational obsolescence is “Economic 
Obsolescence.”  Following initial fielding of a weapon system in a particular 
configuration, the required repair parts may increase in cost as availability falls, even if 
they are still logistically relevant from a design and capabilities perspective, making them 
too expensive to retain in required quantities.  As a typical military weapon system ages, 
its failure rate increases.  This implies that the amount of time that the system is available 
to perform its mission relative to the number and duration of times that it requires 
unscheduled maintenance goes down.  As the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 
parameter for any weapon system drops significantly, the system becomes less 
                                                 
5  Tommy W. Filler, Multi-year II Program Manager, U.S. Army Apache Production 
Programs, The Boeing Company, Mesa, AZ, Personal Interview, 6-8 DEC 2002. 
6  Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components Onto Integrated Circuits, Published in 
“Electronics,” April 19, 1965. pp. 2-4. 
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economically feasible to support and use, especially if a more supportable and capable 
system can be designed and fielded. 
2. Example 
A good example of economic obsolescence is found in examination of the UH-1H 
“Huey” Utility Helicopter.7  This venerable system served the U.S. Army remarkably 
well for nearly forty years in a variety of roles ranging from troop-transport to cargo 
hauling, medical evacuation, and even gunship roles.  It still serves other U.S. Services 
and a number of allies in lower operational tempos and lower risk missions than those for 
which the U.S. Army used the aircraft.  However, as the aircraft aged and its components 
broke, spares became much more difficult to obtain and the aircraft spent more and more 
time in the hangar versus its time on the flight line or in the air.  As a result, although the 
aircraft could theoretically still perform its assigned mission in an acceptable manner 
from a tactical perspective, it was not logistically and economically sound to continue to 
support it.   It was ultimately divested from the Army in favor of the newer, more 
capable, and far more economically supportable UH-60 “Blackhawk.”  The U.S. Army’s 
search for a more economically sound utility helicopter began approximately fifteen 
years into the life cycle of the UH-1.  The UH-1H aircraft was deemed to be 
economically obsolete beyond recovery after some thirty-five years of service.8  Note that 
although logistical and economic obsolescence both relate to the ability of the supply 
system to provide spares to support the weapon system, there is a distinction.  In the case 
of logistical obsolescence, we are defining the point of obsolescence to be when the 
required spares are either no longer available, at any price, or when they are no longer 
competitive with current design standards.  Economic obsolescence occurs when spares 
can be obtained and are relevant, but either the availability has diminished to the point 
where the parts are unacceptably expensive or too frequent demands for the spares by an 
individual weapon system makes it too costly to continue to support the weapon system.  
Once data are available, more detailed study should be performed to determine the 
precise relationship and point of separation of these two sub-types of obsolescence.  
 
                                                 
7  Jane’s Information Group, Limited, “Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft,” 91st Edition, 
1340 Braddock Place, Suite 300, Alexandria, VA 22314-1651, USA, 2000-2001, p. 360. 
8  Ibid. 
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D. FUNCTIONAL OBSOLESCENCE  
1. Definition 
Another type of operational obsolescence is “Functional Obsolescence.”  This 
occurs when advancing technology or associated doctrine make a designed system 
function no longer necessary or adequate.  This includes the ability of a system to 
interoperate with other related or co-located systems. 
2. Example 
A good example of this type of obsolescence is the AN/PRC-77 Portable FM 
radio system, a mainstay of Army Light and Mechanized Forces for many years.9  As 
other radio systems emerged and evolved, the PRC-77, designed for single frequency, 
unsecured, line-of-sight communications, no longer had a function on the modern 
battlefield.  More modern radio systems operated with organic voice-scrambling security 
devices, further enhanced by their ability to rapidly frequency-hop over a common set of 
frequencies that all members of an organization used, and used non-line-of-sight 
technology for long-range communications.  Thus, the PRC-77 no longer had a valid 
function within the doctrine of its users after some twenty-five years of service.  The 
PRC-77 was able to sustain relevance up to a point through add-on devices such as the 
KY-57 Voice Security Device.  However, once the standard for voice communication 
required frequency-hopping systems, the PRC-77 was obsolete.  The PRC-77 maintained 
functional relevance for a long time because it operated during a period of relative 
stability in terms of communications functions.  This condition does not presently exist 
and future functional requirements are likely to evolve much quicker than the twenty-five 
year life of the PRC-77.  Also note the distinction between tactical and functional 
obsolescence.  In the example of the M113A2, the functional requirement for an Infantry 
Fighting Vehicle remains relevant, but the M113 could not tactically meet the functional 
requirement.  In the case of the PRC-77, the U.S. Army no longer had any functional 
requirement for a single frequency FM radio, and the PRC-77 was not interoperable with 
the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) frequency-
hopping secure FM communications systems.   
                                                 
9  Jane’s Information Group, Limited, “Jane’s Military Communications”, 23rd 
Edition, 1340 Braddock Place, Suite 300, Alexandria, VA 22314-1651, USA, 2002-2003, 
p. 72. 
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This type of obsolescence can even befall a system early in its designed life.  For 
instance, considerations for the Army’s Objective Force, centered on network-centric 
forces utilizing the Future Combat System (FCS) may make the “Stryker” vehicle’s 
functionality incompatible with evolving battlefield functionalities in less than five years, 
even though it is a new system.  Of potentially even greater significance, FCS 
requirements have the potential to relegate main battle tanks (MBT) to functional 
obsolescence.  The Army’s ground warfare tactics have been designed around heavily 
armored tanks since World War II, but the weight, footprint, and logistical requirements 
of heavily armored vehicles may make their functional concept for strategic deployment 
obsolete as the Army fields lighter, more readily deployable and supportable systems, all 
tied together with network-centric tactics that rely more heavily on superior information 
than on superior armor.10   The recent Iraq War “Iraqi Freedom” again showed the high 
value of heavily armored vehicles when our forces are engaging military forces armed 
with more than small arms; and this point deserves careful consideration by senior 
military and government leadership.  We are not prepared in 2003 to trade 50-tons of 
armor protection for any quantity of information, but this may change as the Department 
of Defense and the U.S. Army progress towards Objective Force Transformation. 
 
E. TECHNOLOGICAL OBSOLESCENCE  
1. Definition 
Technological Obsolescence is yet another form of operational obsolescence.  
This form of obsolescence has to do with revolutionary changes in what we know how to 
make, how we can employ war-fighting systems, or what we have available in the design 
and support of systems.   
2. Example 
For instance, the development of the turbine engine near the end of the Second 
World War made whole classes of highly capable fighter and bomber aircraft near-
instantaneously obsolete.  Such systems as the P-51 “Mustang”, P-38 “Lightning” and B-
29 “Super-Fortress” that enjoyed fearsome reputations during WWII for their agility, 
                                                 
10  United States Army White Paper, Concepts for the Objective Force, General Eric 
K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, November 2001, pp 9-10.  
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firepower and speed became old, slow relics in a matter of a few years.  Much faster and 
more reliable aircraft that could carry larger weapons payloads further and more 
economically were fielded in a short period of time.  The introduction of nuclear weapons 
made whole strategies and groups of strategic weapons obsolete overnight.  High 
payload, precision guided missiles made the Navy’s 16-inch guns, along with the 
Battleships that carried them, operationally obsolete simply because technology offered a 
better and more reliable answer to the same questions that the 16-inch gun was fielded to 
answer.11 
 
F. POLITICAL OBSOLESCENCE  
1. Definition 
A particularly complex, but nevertheless highly important, form of operational 
obsolescence is “Political Obsolescence.”  This occurs whenever either the use and 
support of the weapon system becomes unacceptably hard to justify to American 
Taxpayers or the designed purpose of the weapon becomes politically unacceptable on 
the world stage, even though the weapon is capable of its purpose and is supportable.   
2. Example 
Two excellent examples of this form of operational obsolescence, for different 
reasons, are the Army’s AH-1 “Cobra” Attack Helicopter and the Air Force “Pershing II” 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Missile.  The Cobra could deliver devastating firepower 
against enemy armored formations and was conceptually supportable from a logistical 
perspective, if modernized, but the burden of the Army justifying to Congress and the 
American people the support and use of both the Cobra and the AH-64 “Apache” Attack 
Helicopters became unjustifiably high.  Therefore, the politically astute position for the 
Army was to voluntarily divest itself of the older and less capable Cobra and “put all of 
its eggs into the Apache’s basket.”  The Cobra lost its role as the Army’s premier attack 
helicopter after nineteen years of service, and was completely divested from all Army 
combat aviation forces thirty-two years after it was initially fielded.12   In the case of the 
                                                 
11  David L. Schrady, Distinguished Professor, Operations Logistics, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Personal Interview, 1 October 2002. 
12  Jane’s Information Group, Limited, “Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft,” 91st 
Edition, 1340 Braddock Place, Suite 300, Alexandria, VA 22314-1651, USA, 2000-2001, 
pp. 361-363. 
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Pershing II, although the capabilities of an intermediate range nuclear missile were highly 
desirable to America’s forces, the world political situation made the planned usage and 
continued placement of these missiles on American bases around the world unacceptably 
expensive in terms of political clout.  They were, therefore, removed and destroyed for 
diplomatic, rather than military operational, reasons; only ten years after initial fielding.13 
 
G. MISSION-CHANGE OBSOLESCENCE 
1. Definition 
A very important consideration in the definition and declaration of operational 
obsolescence is changes in the mission of weapon systems over time, as well as the 
existence of an “heir-apparent” follow-on system.  No system can be removed from 
active service due to operational obsolescence, unless, as in the case of the Pershing, its 
entire mission goes away, until there is a better system to fill the void created by the 
removal of the current system.  Also note at this point, I am not equating the terms 
“obsolete” and “useless.”  A weapon system may still be capable of performing a 
necessary function and may have to be supported as presently equipped.  Thus, it is not 
useless, but is nevertheless obsolete, in that there exists a more effective and efficient 
alternative.  We often see excellent examples of this in the forces of our enemies.  The 
2S6 Air Defense System has made the ZSU-23-4 obsolete, and certainly the T-55 Tank is 
obsolete in forces which possess T-72 Tanks.  These obsolete systems still serve useful 
and dangerous roles for some of our enemies, but this does not diminish the fact that they 
are obsolete by reasonable definition. 
2. Example 
There are many examples of aging systems that continue to receive modernization 
funding and logistical support well after they meet the basic criteria of some of the 
definitions given.  The B-52 “Strato-Fortress” Bomber and C-130 “Hercules” Transport 
have each served the U.S. Air Force for almost fifty years.  Both have received many 
expensive upgrades and vast amounts of logistical support.  They require “patchwork” 
fixes to their wing spars and landing gear, and many major new subsystems have been 
                                                 
13  Jane’s Information Group, Limited, “Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems”, 34th 
Edition, 1340 Braddock Place, Suite 300, Alexandria, VA 22314-1651, USA, 2001, p. 
588. 
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designed and incorporated into the aircraft.  Nevertheless, despite being far older than the 
men and women who crew them, these aircraft are still a mainstay of the U.S. Air Force 
war-fighting fleet.14   This remains so because no acceptable designs have been proposed 
which can perform the same required functions as economically as continuing to support 
these old airplanes.  Therefore, they soldier and serve on.  Over their exceptionally long 
life cycles the B-52 and C-130 have continually been modified and modernized to allow 
them to maintain relevance in the face of evolving tactics and strategies.15  Note here that 
the B-52, unlike the other examples where systems have been declared obsolete, is used 
as an example of a system that likely should have been declared obsolete under sub-type 
definitions, but has not been because there is no other system that can fully replace it.  
This fact has cost the U.S. Air Force great sums of modernization dollars, and as a result 
it is even more difficult to justify the decision to divest the aircraft from the force even 
after the point where divestment is otherwise prudent.   
 
H. SERVICE-SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OBSOLESCENCE 
1. Definition 
In this same arena, varying missions from one Service to another in the U.S. 
Department of Defense may cause an aircraft to be obsolete for one Service while not so 
for another.   
2. Example 
For reasons previously addressed the Army has completely divested itself of AH-
1 aircraft, while the U.S. Marine Corps is still upgrading, designing and fielding ever 
more modern versions of this same weapon system.  This is so simply due to the different 
missions and philosophies of the two respective Services.  The United States Marine 
Corps primarily uses attack helicopters for close in fire support coordination in serial and 
ground escort operations, particularly in amphibious ship-to-shore movements and 
subsequent shore operations within the objective area.  The Marine Corps must pay close 
attention to the footprint and volume of its aircraft due to the necessity to park and store                                                  
14  Alan R Washburn, Professor, Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Personal Interview, 30 September 2002. 
15  Jane’s Information Group, Limited, “Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft,” 91st 
Edition, 1340 Braddock Place, Suite 300, Alexandria, VA 22314-1651, USA, 2000-2001, 
p. 388. 
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them on Light Helicopter Amphibious (LHA/LHD) ships.  The United States Army, on 
the other hand, considers its attack helicopter battalions as major maneuver forces, using 
them in heavy anti-armor roles, conducting both close-in and deep attacks, primarily at 
night, and fighting integrated with mechanized forces in reconnaissance and attack 
missions.  Although the Army has concerns for the size and footprint of its combat 
aircraft, the fact that the Army’s aircraft are parked and maintained primarily on land at 
airfields or in relatively spacious tactical assembly areas poses fewer size constraints than 
those faced by the Marine Corps. 
Table 2-1 summarizes the sub-type definitions of operational obsolescence. 
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Type of Obsolescence (Oi)   Definition           Example 
 i = : 
1.  Tactical  inability of a given system to adequately perform the        M113A2 
tactical mission assigned to it; includes the characteristics 
of the system not meeting required doctrinal parameters. 
 
2.  Logistical  inability to be maintained and supported within time-,      AH-64D 
spares, and manpower-feasibility constraints. 
 
3.  Economic  inability to maintain acceptable readiness levels due to     UH-1H 
increased costs as availability falls, making parts too  
expensive to retain in required quantities.  
 
4.  Functional  designed function is no longer necessary or adequate;       PRC-77 
includes the system being interoperable with other  
related systems. 
 
5.  Technological revolutionary changes in what we know how to make,      P-51D 
how we employ systems, or what we have available  
in design and support cause fundamental obsolescence. 
 
6.  Political  use and support of weapon system becomes too hard       Pershing 
to justify or the designed purpose becomes  
unacceptable on the world stage. 
 
7.  Mission Change weapon system meets other definitions but due to there    B-52 
being no follow-on alternative, we are forced to  
absorb high modernization costs and continue to use  
otherwise obsolete systems. 
 
8.  Service Specific  varying missions and philosophies between           AH-1 
Services cause a system to be obsolete for one  
Service while not so for another. 
 
Table 2-1. Table of Definitions and Examples of Types of Obsolescence 
This table summarizes the definitions and examples discussed in detail in the 







III. DEVELOPMENT OF MODELS AND DATA STRUCTURE  
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Models 
There are no existing models used to describe or analyze operational obsolescence 
or any of its sub-types.  I have, therefore, produced models for each of the sub-types of 
obsolescence, using first principles to construct these models.  Each sub-model is a 
probability distribution from the two-parameter Weibull, Lognormal, or Logistic 
Distributions.  The desired shape of the hazard function of each of the models is shown, 
along with sufficient descriptive detail to show why each model is believed to be 
plausible for its particular sub-type of obsolescence.  The grand model for operational 
obsolescence is the product of all of the sub-models taken in sequence.  This allows for 
easy and detailed analysis, and will permit future researchers or users to tailor the model 
to their particular systems and purposes.  It is a very simple process to substitute other 
continuous distributions into the model, if desired. 
To produce my models I used hazard functions that describe the likelihood of 
each sub-type of operational obsolescence occurring in the next small unit of time, given 
that we know that obsolescence has not occurred up to the present time, to model 
obsolescence due to the various different causes.  It is possible to characterize the 
probability distribution for failure time, T, by cumulative distribution functions, 
probability distribution functions, survival functions, or hazard functions.  All of these 
types of functions are important for various purposes.  For this thesis, I have developed 




a. Cumulative Distribution Function16 
The cumulative distribution function (cdf) of T, represented by 
( ) Pr( )F t T t= ≤ , gives the probability that a system will become obsolete before time t.  
                                                 
16 Wallace R. Blitschke and D.N. Prabhakar Murthy, “Reliability Modeling, 
Prediction and Optimization,” Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, 2000, p. 28. 
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b. Probability Density Function17  
The probability density function (pdf) for a continuous random variable T 
is defined as the derivative of F(t) with respect to t, i.e., f(t) = dF(t)/dt.  The pdf can be 
used to represent relative frequency of failure, or in our case, obsolescence, times as a 
function of time.  The pdf is perhaps less important than the other functions for 
applications in reliability of systems, but is used extensively in the development of 
technical results.  The cdf at t is computed as the area under the pdf curve from 0 to t, 
thus giving the probability of failing before time t.  Thus:   
(3.1) 
0
( ) ( )
t
F t f x dx= ∫   
c. Hazard Function18 
The hazard function, h(t), also known as the hazard rate, instantaneous 
failure rate function, or other similar names, is defined as follows: 
(3.2)   ( )0 Pr | ( ) ( )( ) lim 1 ( ) ( )t
t T t t T t f t f th t
t F t R t∆ →
< ≤ + ∆ >= = =∆ −  
where t∆  represents any small change in elapsed time, f(t) is the probability density 
function of the phenomenon under analysis, F(t) is the cumulative distribution function, 
and ( ) 1 ( )R t F t= − . 
The hazard function gives us the propensity of the weapon system to 
become obsolete in the next small increment of time, given that it has not become 
obsolete up to time t.  Thus, for small ∆ t,    
(3.3)    ( ) Pr( | ).h t t t T t t T t⋅∆ ≈ < ≤ + ∆ >  
The hazard function for the Weibull distribution is:19 
(3.4)    
1
( ) th t
ββ
η η
− =     , t > 0. 
                                                 
17 William Q. Meeker and Luis A. Escobar, “Statistical Methods for Reliability 
Data,” Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, 1998, p. 28.   
18  Ibid, pp. 28-29. 
19  Ibid, p. 86. 
19 
0β >  is a shape parameter, and 0η >  is a scale parameter.  When 0 < β < 1, the 
Weibull has a decreasing hazard function.  When β  > 1, the Weibull has an increasing 
hazard function.  The larger the value of the shape parameter, the more sharply the hazard 
function grows exponentially, as can be clearly seen in the hazard function formula in 
equation 3.4.  At precisely β  = 1, the Weibull describes the exponential distribution. 
The lognormal cdf and pdf are:20 
(3.5) log( )( ; , ) nor
tF t µµ σ σ
− = Φ    , 
and 
(3.6) 1 log( )( ; , ) , 0,nor
tf t t
t
µµ σ φσ σ
− = >    
where norφ  and Φ nor are the pdf and cdf, respectively, for the standardized normal.  The 
median, t.5 = exp( µ ) is a scale parameter and σ  > 0 is a shape parameter.  The 
lognormal hazard function starts at 0, increases to some point in time, and then decreases, 
eventually to 0.  For σ  large, the hazard function reaches a maximum early and then 
decreases.  Detailed information on the distributions used in the production of my models 
may be found in Appendix A.   
 
d. Cumulative Hazard Function21 
The hazard function gives a point estimate of the obsolescence probability 
at a specific point in time.  For our purposes it is useful to calculate the cumulative hazard 
function, represented by H(t), which will allow us to derive the total accumulated 
probability of obsolescence up to a particular time t.  That is, 
(3.7)    
0
( ) ( )
t




                                                 
20  Ibid, pp. 82-83. 
21  Ibid, p. 29. 
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e. Reliability Function22 
The survival function, or reliability function, which I represent as R(t), 
gives the probability of a particular system still being operationally relevant beyond a 
given time t.  This is precisely the information we need to study both obsolescence due to 
particular sub-types of obsolescence and overall operational obsolescence.  If we have the 
hazard function we can easily obtain this reliability function, as follows: 
(3.8)    [ ]
0
( ) exp ( ) exp ( ) 1 ( ).
t
R t H t h x dx F t
 = − = − = −  ∫  
B. DATA STRUCTURE23 
In order to make full use of the information in this thesis, the reader must 
understand the definitions given for each of the sub-types of obsolescence that drive the 
umbrella concept of operational obsolescence.  Then each individual user or organization 
must set the criteria for the obsolescence forms they are interested in analyzing, and 
collect data from either applicable historical systems or current systems to apply to the 
models developed.  Obsolescence processes are modeled on a continuous scale, but data 
will always be discrete.  Thus, the user may find it convenient to partition the total time 
line over which they are concerned with obsolescence into intervals.  The length of the 
intervals will depend on evaluation time cycles, measurement precision, and the like, but, 
in general, will appear as: { }0 1 1 2 1 1( , ], ( , ],...( , ], ( , )m m m mt t t t t t t t− + , where 0t = 0, or the start of 
the period, and 1 .mt + = ∞  
For example, if obsolescence times are measured to the nearest month, then each 
interval would be one month long, up to mt , the last recorded time.  The last interval is, of 
course, of infinite length and covers all times after the final recording.  The intervals do 
not all have to be the same length.  Let us define:24 
(3.9) 1 1Pr( ) ( ) ( )i i i i it T t F t F tπ − −= < ≤ = −  
                                                 
22  Ibid, p. 28. 
23  Ibid, pp. 32-33. 
24  Ibid, p.33. 
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as the multinomial probability that any weapon system will become obsolete in interval i.  
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−= < ≤ > = =−  
is the conditional probability that a weapon system will become obsolete in interval i, 
given that the system was not obsolete at the beginning of interval i.  Note that this means 
that 1mp +  = 1, but the only restriction on 1... mp p  is that 0 1.ip≤ ≤   Thus, it is easy to see 
that: 
(3.12) 1( ) [1 ], 1,..., 1.
i
i j jR t p i m== ∏ − = +  
The π  or p values above may be used as alternative sets of basic parameters to 
model discrete obsolescence point data.  The parameters used in my models are those 
from the distributions indicated, and their description may be found in any basic 
statistical reference book.  In general, all of my models use two parameters, the first 
representing the shape of the distribution, and the second, representing the scale of the 
distribution.   
 
C. OBSOLESCENCE MODELS 
Because the understanding and analysis of operational obsolescence is new, there 
is little to no data to analyze in my models.  I use expert opinion, based on my judgment 
and study of the example weapon systems, to develop representative parameters to 
illustrate the analytical techniques that follow.  I am specifically not proposing that these 
are the correct parameters for each of the sub-types of obsolescence.  I am merely 
demonstrating what I believe to be plausible shapes and relative scales for each of the 




1. Tactical Obsolescence 
















Weibull with beta= 3  and eta= 20




Figure 3-1. Graph of the Hazard Function for Tactical Obsolescence 
Figure 3-1 shows Tactical Obsolescence modeled as a Weibull Distribution 
with shape parameter = 3, and scale parameter = 20.  These parameters were chosen 
to obtain the shape and estimated mean time to obsolescence presented in the text 
that follows; using the example weapon system information.  Measures of centrality 
are printed at the top of the box.  Note that for this distribution the shape parameter 
also gives the point in time when we expect there to be a 63.2% chance of 
obsolescence due to this sub-type. 
 
With regard to Tactical Obsolescence, when a new weapon system is fielded our 
enemies will begin virtually immediately to learn all they can about the new system and 
its capabilities.  Once they are comfortable with their understanding of our new weapon 
system, they will begin developing either a counter-weapon system or a modification to 
their tactics to attempt to overcome our new weapon system.  Success is never assured, 
but there is a positive probability that they will succeed in the endeavor.  I believe that 
this probability will logically increase at an increasing rate with time. 
23 
Given that we will always attempt to develop both optimized hardware and 
optimized tactics during our concept development and Operational Testing and 
Evaluation (OT&E) phases of the fielding process for new weapon systems, based on 
current and emerging threats and our current logic for capabilities-based forces, I will 
assume that the weapon system is the best we can make it at the time of fielding.  Thus, 
operational obsolescence risk starts at or near zero, and increases at an increasing rate as 
time advances, without any plateaus, and under the assumption that no modernization 
occurs.  The shape parameter value of 3 is simply a model for obsolescence under 
conditions where we expect an increasing risk of obsolescence at an increasing rate as 
time passes.  This value causes the ratio of time to the scale parameter to be squared in 
the Weibull hazard function formula shown in equation 3.4.  Thus, with a scale parameter 
of 3, we see a quadratic increase in the risk of the weapon system becoming obsolete in 





















2. Logistical Obsolescence 
 








Weibull with beta= 3  and eta= 1.5
Mean:  1.3395  Median:  1.3275 Mode:  1.3104
Logistical Obsolescence
 
Figure 3-2. Graph of the Hazard Function for Logistical Obsolescence  
Figure 3-2 shows the model for logistical obsolescence.  The estimated shape 
parameter is the same as for tactical obsolescence, but the scale is much smaller.  A 
scale parameter of 1.5 means that there is a 63.2% chance the system will be 
obsolete after 18 months.  This reflects the effects reported by Project Manager 
Office personnel and major contractors and is consistent with Moore’s Law.  Note 
the drastic change in the horizontal axis of this graph as compared to Figure 3-1, 
although the shape of the curve is identical.  This displays the relative roles of the 
shape and scale parameters.   
25 








Weibull with beta= 3  and eta= 3
Mean:  2.6789  Median:  2.655 Mode:  2.6207
Logistical Obsolescence
 
Figure 3-3. A Second Graph of the Hazard Function for Logistical Obsolescence 
 
Figure 3-3 shows the hazard function for logistical obsolescence with the 
improved system for purchasing and maintaining spares for electronic components.  
The scale parameter has been doubled, resulting in the measures of centrality being 
twice as large as those from Figure 3-2. 
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Weibull with beta= 3  and eta= 6
Mean:  5.3579  Median:  5.31 Mode:  5.2415
Logistical Obsolescence
 
Figure 3-4. A Third Graph of the Hazard Function for Logistical Obsolescence 
Figure 3-4 shows a third model for logistical obsolescence in which two simultaneous 
improvements in the logistical system results in a quadrupling of the original scale 
parameter.  Such an improved logistical design gives us a four-fold increase in the 
estimated time until modernization is required due to logistical obsolescence of the 
system. 
 
Due to the large numbers of component parts in all sub-systems of any weapon 
system, particularly one that relies heavily on electronic components, there is a very real 
risk of a weapon system suffering from logistical obsolescence from the moment is it 
fielded, and perhaps even prior to fielding.  Parts required to build components and 
systems may be superceded or may no longer be produced in their original form by sub-
contractors.25  Therefore, the risk of logistical obsolescence increases rapidly at an 
increasing rate with the passage of time.  This sub-type will dominate the model unless 
the weapon system is frequently modernized, or production plans have a specific counter-
                                                 
25  Tommy W. Filler, Multi-year II Program Manager, U.S. Army Apache Production 
Programs, The Boeing Company, Mesa, AZ, Personal Interview, 6-8 DEC 2002. 
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obsolescence section, which may include large buys of all critical parts.  In Figure 3-2, I 
have shown the estimated graph of the hazard function for logistical obsolescence versus 
time under conditions where we have carefully and deliberately purchased all electronic 
components anticipated to both manufacture and sustain all production vehicles in a 
multi-year (MY) contract.  This one action should at least double the scale parameter of 
the hazard function, i.e., double the expected time to operational obsolescence due to 
logistical obsolescence simply because acceptable current generation components will 
now be available in sufficient quantities to produce and support the systems fielded under 
the MY contract.  In Figure 3-3, I have shown the estimated effect of taking this same 
step along with the added step of purchasing cutting edge electronic components 
immediately before beginning the MY production.  Such a “just-in-time modernization 
update” is estimated to at least quadruple the initial scale parameter of the logistical 
obsolescence model, resulting in a two generation, or approximately four-fold, extension 
of the relevant life of the weapon system before significant modernization would be 
required.  Under this methodology we would capture one electronic component 
generation for each of the two actions of having the most current proven generation of 
electronic components immediately before commencing production and purchasing the 
components in sufficient quantity up front to produce and support all production vehicles 
in the contract.  Note that the multiplicative increase in the scale parameter will be a 
function of the number of years specified in the MY contract.  The above example 
anticipates a MY buy of only one full component generation.  A MY contract extended 
over five years would see the scale parameter increased 3.33-fold.  The down-side is that 
the longer the MY contract the more difficult it would be to anticipate needs and 
developments during the life of the contract, and the larger an amount of “accepted 
obsolescence” would occur during the period that we were holding component 
advancement static.     
Of particular value is the concept of designing weapon systems so that electronic 
components could be modernized through spare part replacement with enhanced 
components well into the future by requiring contractors to maintain form, fit, and 
function of all parts, along with extensive use of open-architecture design that allows 
integration of new parts from any number of contractors or sources.  This single step, the 
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difficulty and complexity of which should not be taken lightly, could ensure that our 
weapon systems maintained logistical relevance throughout their life cycles, and could 
save large sums of modernization dollars in contrast to designing and using system 
specific and military specification components.  If successful, attainment of this process 
would essentially remove logistical obsolescence from the weapon systems’ reliability 
model; causing any ensuing obsolescence to be properly placed under technological 
obsolescence.  Obsolescence due to spares would now occur due to such a significant 
technological advancement that the new part represented a revolutionary jump in how we 
design and support weapon systems. 
 
3. Economic Obsolescence 
 
















Weibull with beta= 3  and eta= 15
Mean:  13.395  Median:  13.275 Mode:  13.104
Economic Obsolescence
 
Figure 3-5. Graph of the Hazard Function for Economic Obsolescence 
Figure 3-5 shows the individual model for economic obsolescence.  The shape 
is the same as for logistical obsolescence but the much larger scale parameter 
represents the belief that the system will not be vulnerable to economic obsolescence 
until much later in its life cycle. 
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The risk of Economic Obsolescence is near zero immediately following initial 
fielding because fielding plans will include an Operations and Sustainment (O & S) Plan 
and Budget which should prevent the immediate onset of obsolescence.  There is a strong 
relationship between economic and logistical obsolescence because if the same parts 
required to avoid logistical obsolescence are not purchased in sufficient quantity upfront, 
they will become non-economically feasible to requisition and stock.  Therefore, 
logistical and economic obsolescence have the same shape, but the scale is different.  
Even under these conditions, I believe that the onset of economic obsolescence lags 
several years behind the onset of logistical obsolescence.  I assess these two sub-types of 
obsolescence to be independently but not identically distributed, as described in Chapter 
II.  I recommend further research to draw the remaining distinctions between these two 
sub-types for use in my models after data are available.  The risk of economic 
obsolescence is felt to increase over time at an increasing rate, perhaps particularly so 
after a certain point, which may be found to be the critical O&S point for a given weapon 


















4. Functional Obsolescence 
 
















Logistic with mu= 10  and sigma= 1.7
Mean:  10    Variance:   9.5077
Functional Obsolescence
 
Figure 3-6. Graph of the Hazard Function for Functional Obsolescence 
Figure 3-6 shows the model for functional obsolescence, which reflects that 
the risk of functional obsolescence is initially low; increases rapidly during the 
middle portion of a weapon systems life cycle; and then given that it has not 
occurred after more than ten years converges to an asymptotic value dependent on 
the particular weapon system. 
 
Functional obsolescence initially enjoys some of the same advantages as tactical 
obsolescence as a result of the search for optimization during design and OT&E.  We 
may assume that weapon systems are always fielded to meet a valid functional 
requirement and that this function is deemed relevant well into the foreseeable future.  
However, functional requirements can unexpectedly change as defense strategies, 
technology, etc. evolve.  Therefore, the risk of functional obsolescence for a given 
weapon system will always start at zero and the risk may be considered to have a small, 
but positive probability in the early portion of the weapon’s life-cycle.  This risk will 
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increase to a significant level as time advances.  After a weapon system has enjoyed 
successful deployment for a number of years, believed to likely be somewhere in the 
neighborhood of ten to fifteen years, the risk of functional obsolescence continues to 
increase, but at a decreasing rate, as tactics and supporting weapon systems are developed 
around the functionalities and capabilities of successful major systems.  Functional 
obsolescence is a continuous risk throughout the weapon’s life cycle, but unlike most of 
the other sub-types is never guaranteed to occur as certain functional requirements may 
exist for decades allowing weapon systems designed to meet these requirements to 
maintain functional relevance throughout even a protracted life cycle. 
 
5. Technological Obsolescence 
 












Weibull with beta= 3.5  and eta= 16




Figure 3-7. Graph of the Hazard Function for Technological Obsolescence 
Figure 3-7 shows the model developed for technological obsolescence.  This 
model reflects the belief that the risk of obsolescence likely increases slightly more 
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rapidly than that of the previous sub-types of obsolescence due to the rapid pace of 
technological discovery and advancement, but over roughly the same scale.  
 
We must clearly differentiate between true technological obsolescence and 
logistical obsolescence driven by advancing technology.  These are not the same thing!  
Technological obsolescence occurs not when an existing technology gets better, but when 
a revolutionary technological breakthrough occurs or becomes mature enough to be 
militarily useful and reliable.  Such an event calls for existing weapon systems within the 
mission area of the breakthrough to be completely redesigned or face a high likelihood of 
being easily and thoroughly defeated on the battlefield.  There appears not to be any 
available data or even hypotheses among aviation contractors as to the mean time 
between major technological breakthroughs or the probability of a revolutionary 
technological event occurring in any given time frame.26 
Technological obsolescence receives some protection through the meticulous 
search for the most imaginative capabilities feasible during the weapon system’s concept 
development.  Therefore, the initial risk is very low.  The risk of technological 
obsolescence increases at a slow but increasing rate with time.  Technological 













                                                 
26  Tommy W. Filler, Multi-year II Program Manager, U.S. Army Apache Production 
Programs, The Boeing Company, Mesa, AZ, Personal Interview, 6-8 DEC 2002. 
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6. Political Obsolescence 
 

























Weibull with beta= 1  and eta= 15
Mean:  15  Median:  10.397 Mode:  0
Political Obsolescence
 
Figure 3-8. Graph of the Hazard Function for Political Obsolescence 
Figure 3-8 shows the model for political obsolescence.  The shape parameter 
of “1” shows that the obsolescence hazard is exponential.  Therefore, political 
obsolescence may occur with little warning at any point in the weapon system’s life 
cycle.  Historical review of example systems was used to estimate the mean of this 
sub-type of obsolescence.  This is a particularly difficult form to design and plan 
against. 
 
Political Obsolescence is particularly dangerous and devastating.  It is often much 
more difficult with political obsolescence than with other sub-types to detect and avoid 
the impending occurrence of a catastrophic obsolescence event.  However, once a 
weapon system is declared to be politically obsolete it must generally either be destroyed 
or modernized in such a dramatic sense that it barely resembles its original form.  
Political obsolescence may follow a conflict in which the weapon was used, probably to 
great success but at tremendous cost to one side or the other.  It may also simply occur 
during peacetime when the global political climate becomes altered by some event.  The 
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risk of political obsolescence is unpredictable, but is a constant and significant risk 
throughout the life cycle of any weapon system.  This is why the shape parameter will 
always be one, representing the exponential distribution, which represents potential 
occurrences at anytime throughout the weapon system’s life cycle.  The best plan to 
avoid political obsolescence may well be seeking to develop non-overlapping weapon 
systems, which are particularly effective in a given role, but produce very low avoidable 
collateral damage and little or no lingering effects following their use in a conflict.  The 
rate of political obsolescence varies widely by type and design of weapon system.  For 
instance, weapons of mass destruction and area fire weapons are likely much more 
vulnerable to political obsolescence than are rifles and trucks.  Landmines are 
increasingly threatened with this type of obsolescence, although they may be relatively 






















7. Mission Change and Lack of Heir Apparent Systems 
 
















Lognormal with mu= 2.5  and sigma= 1.2
Mean:  25.028
Mission Change with no Heir-Apparent
 
Figure 3-9. Graph of the Hazard Function for Obsolescence due to Mission Changes 
with no Heir-Apparent 
Figure 3-9 shows the model for obsolescence due to significant changes in the 
weapon system’s mission, particularly in the absence of a follow-on replacement 
weapon system.  The risk of obsolescence due to changing missions will increase 
rapidly in the early portion of the weapon systems life cycle and then decrease 
rapidly given that the system has not been divested, eventually asymptotically 
approaching zero after many years of successful usage since if the system is heavily 
modernized multiple times to perform changing missions and no heir-apparent 
emerges, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify divestment of the system.  
 
Weapon systems may be assigned to roles and functions quite different from those 
that the weapon system was initially fielded to perform.  Successful accomplishment of 
these tasks and roles may not be possible in the absence of significant modernization.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I will assess the risk of operational obsolescence due to 
mission change following termination of modernization funding for the weapon system 
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under consideration.  I see this as a near zero risk initially but having a rapid and  
increasing risk during the early years of the weapon system’s life cycle.  The risk will 
increase up to a maximum level, followed by constant or decreasing risk.  As previously 
noted, there are numerous examples of aircraft systems that undergo substantial mission 
changes without an economical and effective heir-apparent replacement system which 
can perform the modified mission as well as the existing system.  If a weapon system has 
no heir-apparent and its mission changes substantially following termination of 
modernization funding, we will be faced with having to accept a certain degree of risk of 
obsolescence while we continue to use the weapon system.  Generally, the decision to 
make substantial changes to a weapon system’s mission profile must be accompanied by 
the decision to renew modernization efforts in order to accomplish the new mission. 
 
8. Service-Specific Influence 
 
















Weibull with beta= 2  and eta= 15
Mean:  13.293  Median:  12.488 Mode:  10.607
Service-Specific Influence
 
Figure 3-10. Graph of the Hazard Function for Obsolescence due to Service-Specific 
Influences 
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Figure 3-10 shows the model for obsolescence due to Service-specific 
influences.  The risk of a weapon system that has not become obsolete due to 
another sub-type of obsolescence becoming obsolete specifically within any given 
Service is believed to increase at a fairly constant rate over time.  In the absence of 
other sub-types forcing obsolescence, Service-specific obsolescence would likely be 
heavily influenced by the particular philosophies, roles, missions, and needs of each 
Service which uses the weapon system. 
 
Different Services within the Department of Defense often look at their similar 
missions and weapon systems differently.  The risk of obsolescence due to Service 
influence is zero at the beginning of a weapon system’s life cycle, since Service 
acquisition decision-makers can safely be assumed to always purchase only weapon 
systems that are highly desired and thoroughly tested.  However, I believe that the risk 
increases at approximately a constant rate as time progresses, and alternative weapon 
systems and functional demands occur.  Note: that this form of obsolescence must be 
considered to be a subset of other sub-types; yet must be modeled separately due to 
historical evidence that all Services do not and will not declare weapon systems to be 
obsolete at the same rate or the same time.  This sub-area is related to, but still fully 
independent of, both tactical and functional obsolescence, but differs from them in that as 
Service-Specific roles change, along with Service leadership philosophies, there is an 
ever-present risk of one or more Services feeling the need to influence divestment of a 
given weapon system, even while it still enjoys success within other Services.  Such 
things as overall Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), level of Defense Spending, and 































IV. ANALYSIS OF MODEL OUTPUT 
 
A. COMPETING FAILURE RATES27 
Since we have defined operational obsolescence to be a function of many 
different sub-types of individual obsolescence, any weapon system may become obsolete 
due to more than one mode of obsolescence.  One should take the view that the weapon 
system could have become operationally obsolete due to any one of the possible forms of 
obsolescence.  By this view, the obsolescence forms "compete" as to which causes 
operational obsolescence for each particular weapon system.  This can be viewed as a 
series system reliability model, with each obsolescence form comprising a block of the 
series system. Competing obsolescence forms analysis divides the analyses of 
obsolescence forms and then combines these results to provide an overall model for the 
weapon system under consideration.  This methodology assumes statistical independence 
between the various sub-types of obsolescence, which is a strong, but necessary 
assumption, and is discussed in the following paragraphs.  Until we have data, it is not 
feasible to either prove or disprove the independence assumption. 
In order to begin analyzing data on weapon systems with more than one 
competing obsolescence form, we must perform a separate analysis for each sub-type of 
obsolescence. During each of these analyses, the point of obsolescence times for all other 
obsolescence forms not being analyzed are considered to be suspensions. This is 
necessary because the weapon system under analysis would have become obsolete, at 
some time in the future, due to the obsolescence form being analyzed, had the unrelated 
form not being analyzed not occurred. Thus in that case, the information available shows 
that the form under analysis did not occur and the weapon system under consideration 
accumulated valid time without becoming operationally obsolete due to the form under 
analysis or a suspension due to that form. 
                                                 
27  Competing Failure Modes, ReliaSoft Corporation, Tucson, AZ, 1996-2000, p.1. 
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Once the analysis for each separate obsolescence form has been completed, the 
resulting reliability equation for the weapon system due to all forms is the product of the 
reliability equation for each form, or:    
(4.1) 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( )nR t R t R t R t= ⋅ ⋅  
where n is the total number of obsolescence forms considered.  This is the product rule 
for the reliability of series systems with statistically independent components, which 
states that the reliability for a series system is equal to the product of the reliability values 
of the components comprising the system.  This causes the effect that the overall 
reliability of the weapon system is the minimum of the reliabilities based on the 
reliabilities of the sub-types.  Thus, we find that reliabilities multiply; while hazard 
functions for each of the sub-types are additive.28  Note that Ri(t) is a reliability function 
that may be based on any assumed life distribution.  In the production of this thesis the 
life distribution is the 2-parameter Weibull for all forms except Mission Change and 
Functional Obsolescence; and is the Lognormal for Mission Change, and the Logistic for 
Functional, sub-types of obsolescence.  Any continuous life distribution can easily be 
used and would not affect the analytical techniques defined and illustrated in this thesis. 
The equation for system reliability assumes that all the sub-types are statistically 
independent.  At this point, I cannot be sure whether all the sub-types defined and 
examined are independent or not.  Indeed, I suspect that there are serial dependencies 
among economic and logistical obsolescences, and potential colinearities among tactical, 
service-specific, and functional.  I am making the simplifying assumption that all forms 
will behave independently for the purposes of this analysis.  I feel that any errors induced 
will be small in magnitude, if they occur at all.  Research into inter-dependencies 




                                                 
28  William Q. Meeker and Luis A. Escobar, “Statistical Methods for Reliability 
Data,” Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, 1998, p. 116. 
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1. Bounds on Reliability29  
 









= ∏  
where, 
Rˆ  represents our estimate of the reliability, 
ˆ
iR  is the estimated reliability of the i
th sub-type, 
n is the total number of sub-types; eight in this thesis. 
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ακ  is defined by, 
(4.5) 
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∞ −= = − Φ∫  
 
If δ  is the confidence level, then 1
2
δα −=  for the two-sided bounds, and 1α δ= −  for 
the one-sided bounds. 
  
                                                 
29  Competing Failure Modes, ReliaSoft Corporation, Tucson, AZ, 1996-2000, p.5. 
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 ∂=  ∂ ∑  
where ˆiα  is an element of the model parameter vector. Therefore, the value of ˆ( )iVar R  is 
dependent on the underlying distribution.  This procedure for the for the computation of 
the point estimate and estimated variance of reliability is known as the “delta method” or 
method of “statistical error propagation.”31  The delta method for estimating approximate 
expected values and variances of smooth non-linear functions of the parameters of 
models by linear functions of these same parameters is based on Taylor Series expansions 
of the functions.  Additional detail on this method may be obtained by consulting Section 
2 of Appendix B of Meeker and Escobar’s “Statistical Methods for Reliability Data”, 
1998; Hahn and Shapiro, 1967, p. 228; or Stuart and Ord, 1994, p. 350.   
For the Weibull distribution,  
(4.10) ( )2ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )iui i iVar R R e Var u=  
where,  
(4.11) ( )ˆˆ ˆ ˆln( ) ln( )i i i iu tβ γ η= − −  
For the lognormal distribution,  
                                                 
30  Ibid 
31  William Q. Meeker and Luis A. Escobar, “Statistical Methods for Reliability Data,” Wiley Series in 
Probability and Statistics, 1998, p. 619. 
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For the logistic distribution,  












These formulas give us the ability to calculate both a point estimate for the 
expected reliability of the weapon system and to establish desired confidence intervals for 
this estimate. 
 
2. Bounds on Time32 
 
The bounds on time are estimated by solving the reliability equation with respect 
to time, for all i = 1 to n sub-types of obsolescence.  Mathematically:  
(4.16) ˆˆ ˆ( , , )i it R a bϕ=  
(4.17) 1,i n=  
where, 
ϕ  is the inverse function for the Reliability Equation, 
for the Weibull distribution ˆia  is ˆiβ , and iˆb  is ˆiη , 
for the lognormal distribution ˆia  is ˆiµ , and iˆb  is ˆ iσ . 
for the logistic distribution ˆia  is ˆiµ , and iˆb  is ˆ iσ . 
 
Set, 
(4.18) ln( )u t=  
                                                 
32  Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
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The bounds on u are estimated from:  
(4.19) ˆ ˆ( )Uu u Var uακ= +  
and,  
(4.20) ˆ ˆ( )Lu u Var uακ= −  
Then the upper and lower bounds on time are found by using the equations,  
(4.21) UuUt e=  
and, 
(4.22) LuLt e=  




ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( , )
n
i i i i
i i i i i
u u u uVar u Var a Var b Cov a b
a b a b=
    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = + +    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
∑  
As with the bounds on reliability, these formulas allow us to calculate a point 
estimate of the time when we expect a particularly modeled weapon system to become 
obsolete, as well as an estimated earliest time of obsolescence and latest time of 
obsolescence. 
  
B. ANALYSIS OF MODEL OUTPUT 
The analysis of the overall issue of operational obsolescence within this thesis 
was performed by combining the individual models of each of the sub-types of 
obsolescence into a grand model using the metric described above.  The grand model was 
then run in a statistical software package known as BlockSim®, a product of the 
ReliaSoft Corporation, Tucson, AZ.  The grand model output was graphed in three forms, 
described below to gain insights into how the weapon system could be expected to 
perform over time.  The probability of obsolescence versus time and rate of system 
obsolescence versus time were assessed for understanding of how long we should expect 
a weapon system in a certain configuration to remain relevant before it would require 
modernization.  Then I produced a third and final graph which showed the relative 
importance of each sub-type of obsolescence to the obsolescence rate of the weapon 
system to determine where design and modernization dollars should be invested to 
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maximize the relevance period over the projected life cycle of the weapon system.  
Before showing example graphs, I will describe the methodology of producing the graphs 
and how information is obtained and interpreted from the graphs. 
The first graph is Probability of Obsolescence versus Time.  In this graph the 
model first calculates the point of near-certainty of system obsolescence in years and sets 
the upper endpoint of the x-axis to this value, scaling between 0 and this value in 
between.  The y-axis is probability of obsolescence and is thus simply a linear scale from 
0 to 1, or from 0% to 100%, as desired.  The curve of the graph is monotonic increasing 
and shows the rate of growth of obsolescence probability along the time line from time 0 
to the projected point of near-certainty of system obsolescence. 
The second graph in each series is the Obsolescence Hazard versus Time.  The x-
axis in this graph is identical to the first graph.  The y-axis is evenly scaled from 0 to the 
maximum rate at which the weapon system is becoming obsolete, as determined by the 
overall hazard function for the weapon system.  The curve then shows how the 
obsolescence rate varies over time from time 0 until the  point of system obsolescence.  
Time 0 is defined to be the point of initial fielding of the system or immediately 
following modernization. 
The third graph, Reliability Importance versus Time, helps us determine where 
modernization dollars should be invested, or alternatively where to concentrate design 
effort to extend the time period before modernization is required.  This graph has its x-
axis scaled like the first two graphs, and its y-axis is scaled from 0 to 1.  There is an 
individual curve for each sub-type of obsolescence.  Each curve shows the partial 
derivative of the weapon system’s reliability function with respect to the reliability 
function of the individual sub-type under consideration.  That is: 




∂= =∂ ∏ . 
Notice that the Importance Value is the same value I used in equation 4.7 when I 
estimated the variance of the estimated value for the reliability of the system.  This value 
plotted against time shows the influence of each sub-type of obsolescence on the overall 
decline in system reliability at any given point in time from time 0 until the system 
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becomes obsolete, given the current model parameters.  I conclude that the sub-type(s) 
with the greatest influence is the most important.  I can then multiply each importance 
value by the relative cost per sub-type to realize an improvement in the reliability 
function for that sub-type in order to determine the sub-type with the greatest return on 
investment to help decide where to invest design or modernization dollars.  That is, the 
change in reliability with respect to invested dollars is equal to the change in overall 
reliability with respect to changes in the reliability of each sub-type times the change in 











∂  is often hard to estimate.  It is known that for high levels of iR , $
iR∂
∂  
is very small.  Reliability is increasingly expensive as reliabilities of sub-types diminish.   
  
    
1. Overall Reliability Model With a Typical Current Configuration 
For the initial excursion I defined a typical weapon system as one modeled with 
each sub-type of obsolescence modeled with the distributions and parameters shown 
during model development in Chapter III.  This represents no particular weapon system, 
but is considered a plausible representation of a typical weapon system with current 
design parameters.  Table 4-1 shows the models and parameters chosen to represent each 










Sub-type of Obsolescence (Oi) Model          Shape Parameter          Scale Parameter 
 i = : 
1.  Tactical    Weibull  3   20 
 
2.  Logistical    Weibull  3   1.5  
 
3.  Economic    Weibull  3   15   
 
4.  Functional    Logistic33  3.08   10  
 
5.  Technological   Weibull  3.5   16   
 
6.  Political    Weibull  1   15  
 
7.  Mission Change   Lognormal  2.5   1.2 
 
8.  Service Specific    Weibull  2   15  
 
Table 4-1. Table of Distribution Models and Parameters of Sub-types of 
Obsolescence 
Table 4-1 summarizes the life cycle distributions and parameters used to 
model each of the sub-types of obsolescence.  These are discussed in detail in the text 











                                                 
33  Due to a limitation in BlockSim®, the Normal distribution was used to represent 
the Logistic distribution in the overall model, owing to the similarity of these two 
distributions.  See Appendix A, Section A.3. for a more detailed description. 
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0.000 0.750 1.500 2.250 3.000
Time, (t=yrs)
Probability of Obsolescence vs Time  with LogObs~Weib(3,1.5)
 
Figure 4-1. Graph of the Probability of Obsolescence versus Time for Current 
Configuration 
Figure 4-1 shows that the probability of obsolescence increases at an 
increasing rate for approximately the first 1.05 years; increases at a relatively linear 
rate for the next 0.6 years, and then increases at a decreasing rate until the system is 
assured of becoming obsolete approximately 2.55 years after fielding.  Logistical 
obsolescence dominates the model with the parameters believed to represent current 
systems.  The expected time to obsolescence for this weapon system is 1.25 years; 


















0.000 0.750 1.500 2.250 3.000
Time, (t=yrs)
Obsolescence Rate vs Time with LogObs~Weib(3,1.5)
 
Figure 4-2. Graph of the Obsolescence Rate versus Time for Current Configuration 


































Reliability Importance vs Time with LogObs~Weib(3,1.5)
 
Figure 4-3. Graph of the Reliability Importance versus Time for Current 
Configuration 
Figure 4-3 shows that Logistical obsolescence is dominating all other sub-
types of obsolescence by a large margin.  Thus, we conclude that it is much more 
important, and potentially valuable, to resolve logistical obsolescence under current 
conditions than to invest in improvements in any other sub-forms of obsolescence.  
We will have a complete picture of this once actual system reliability and cost data 
are available. 
  
2. Overall Reliability With Phase I Improvements 
To demonstrate the analytical approach used and the value of the model, I now 
propose Phase I of a conceptual Product Improvement Program (PIP).  During this phase 
of the PIP, we will improve the timeline of component development, fielding the most 
technologically superior parts and components that have demonstrated adequate 
reliability for the designed weapon system.  As described in Chapter III, I postulate that 
reasonable expectations for this “just in time fielding” practice under Moore’s Law 
assumptions gives us a four-fold increase in the scale parameter of the logistical 
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obsolescence model, where we determined in the last excursion that our efforts should be 
concentrated.   
 








0.000 2.250 4.500 6.750 9.000
Time, (t=yrs)
Probability of Obsolescence vs Time with LogObs~Weib(3,6)
 
Figure 4-4. Graph of the Probability of Obsolescence versus Time with Phase I 
Improvements 
The shape and general behavior of the graph are the same as in excursion 
one, but a four-fold increase in the scale parameter of the logistical obsolescence 
model translates to a four-fold scaling of the x-axis.  The mean time to obsolescence 
for this improved weapon system design structure is 3.66 years; with a median time 


















0.000 2.250 4.500 6.750 9.000
Time, (t=yrs)
Obsolescence Rate vs Time with LogObs~Weib(3,6)
 
Figure 4-5. Graph of the Obsolescence Rate versus Time with Phase I Improvements 
As in Figure 4-4, we continue to see improvement in the reliability of the 
modeled weapon system.  A four-fold increase in the scale parameter of logistical 
obsolescence decreases the rate of system obsolescence by approximately four, with 
a corresponding increase in the expected time to system obsolescence.  Thus, the 
application of a smarter fielding methodology, that of purchasing the most 
technology advanced electronic components that have proven reliable and 
applicable as close to commencement of production as possible; and purchasing 
sufficient quantities of the components to complete production and support of all 
vehicles in the MY contract; with relatively little, if any, direct increase in fielding 




























Reliability Importance vs Time with LogObs~Weib(3,6)
 
Figure 4-6. Graph of the Reliability Importance versus Time with Phase I 
Improvements 
Improvements to the logistical reliability of the weapon system cause other 
sub-types to be more influential during the first few years following fielding or 
major modernization, when the probability of system obsolescence is relatively low 
overall.  However, after approximately three and a half years, logistical obsolescence 
again dominates the model, and continues to do so until the system eventually 
reaches the point of obsolescence.  I conclude from this that investment in logistical 
relevance has paid off, and that this is still the likely area where we should 
concentrate our next phase of effort.  Note that the most important sub-type in the 
early years of the systems life is now political obsolescence, which is non-addressable 
with modernization money.  
 
3. Overall Reliability With Phase II Improvements 
As a final demonstration of the value of using the models and methods developed 
and presented in this thesis, I propose as Phase II of the PIP that by investing significant 
resources into the most important current sub-type of obsolescence, logistical in this 
example, to optimize open architecture design with all contractors committing to develop 
future components that maintain form, fit, and function with the fielded design it is 
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possible to realize modernization through spares.  This realization would essentially 
cause logistical obsolescence to become non-applicable as a driving force towards overall 
system obsolescence since we would be able to keep the weapon system logistically 
relevant throughout its life cycle.  It is not currently possible to prove that this 
methodology would produce results as optimal as those postulated, but these results are 
presented to demonstrate the potential value of the model and analytical methods for use 
in the future. 
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Figure 4-7. Graph of the Probability of Obsolescence versus Time with Phase II 
Improvements 
Figure 4-7 shows that with logistical obsolescence removed the probability of 
obsolescence is fairly linear over time until approximately nine years at which time 
the probability of obsolescence increases at a decreasing rate until the hypothetical 
weapon system reaches the point of near-certain obsolescence.  The mean time to 
obsolescence with this system design is 4.76 years; with a median time to 
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Figure 4-8. Graph of the Obsolescence Rate versus Time with Phase II Improvements 
Figure 4-8 shows that the rate of obsolescence with logistical obsolescence 
removed is relatively low for at least the first six years.  Following this period, the 
rate increases at a slowly increasing rate until the system becomes obsolete due to 
other influences, or is modernized. 
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Figure 4-9. Graph of the Reliability Importance versus Time with Phase II 
Improvements 
In Figure 4-9 we see that by determining and fixing our most important 
cause(s) of obsolescence we may succeed at eliminating the dominant forces driving 
our systems to obsolescence.  The influences on system reliability are relatively 
equal and manageable, particularly beyond the point where the probability of 
system obsolescence is high, between the remaining sub-types of obsolescence.  The 
dominant forms in the first ten years of the weapon system’s life cycle are political 
and mission change.  We cannot fix political obsolescence through monetary 
investment.  Mission change obsolescence requires modernization or a deliberate 
decision to accept a certain degree of obsolescence with the weapon system as is.  At 
this point there is no obvious single controllable source of system obsolescence. 
 
This concludes the analysis of the models developed in this thesis.  For the 
hypothetical typical weapon system, logistical obsolescence was the dominant sub-type.  
Therefore, I invested resources to solve the problems associated with logistical 
obsolescence of my system.  This same approach can be used successfully on any real 
weapon system for which we have reliability data that we can use to estimate the required 
parameters for the models. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS FROM MODELS 
I have developed the first working definition for the troubling phenomenon of 
operational obsolescence.  I propose that this definition be accepted by and incorporated 
into the vocabulary of the U.S. Army Acquisition Corps, as well as the Army community.  
The definition may need to be refined and evolved over time.  Nevertheless, the 
definition within this thesis gives us a common starting point from which to continue to 
study, discuss, and remediate the problem of operational obsolescence of our weapon 
systems.  This thesis demonstrates that the overarching concept of operational 
obsolescence of any particular weapon system actually rests on eight obsolescence 
pillars, comprised of the eight sub-types of obsolescence defined and developed within 
this thesis.  Each of these sub-types has been modeled individually and plausible 
distributions and parameters are presented for each of these “feeders” of the overall 
obsolescence model for any weapon system.  Under the assumption of statistical 
independence of the sub-types of obsolescence, I have developed and demonstrated the 
overall or grand model for weapon system obsolescence by showing that hazard functions 
are additive and thus the overall reliability model is the product of the reliability 
functions of each of the sub-types of obsolescence. 
In order to obtain maximum value from this research effort, we must have data.  
No single weapon system or group of weapon systems can adequately represent the full 
spectrum of issues that we must examine to fully understand and address operational 
obsolescence.  Accordingly, the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity 
(AMSAA) or other similar agency should develop a reference database containing the 
timelines and estimated parameters needed for the models developed in this thesis.  To be 
accurate and useful the database would have to cover dozens or even hundreds of 
representative weapon systems with inputs obtained over decades.  Therefore, I 
recommend that a separate research effort be performed to obtain this data.  The research 
would either have to be collected for many years into the future, or better, criteria 
developed for when historical weapon systems became obsolete for each of the eight sub-
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types developed in my thesis, and a database assembled from historical data over the past 
forty to fifty years.   
Once data are available and parameters are estimated for the models developed, 
these models will show the distribution and time to obsolescence for any weapon system 
under study, as well as the dominant and contributing sources for that obsolescence.  
Using graphs similar to those used in Chapter IV for analysis of the output from my 
models, it is possible for acquisition and support personnel to find the areas of concern 
for any production and support scheme devised for a weapon system.  From this point, it 
is a straightforward process to develop courses of action necessary to detect and delay or 
prevent obsolescence of a weapon system, which can now be done in an informed and 
organized fashion.  We can delay or prevent obsolescence by directly attacking the type 
and source of obsolescence most influential in driving the system to obsolescence. 
This thesis cannot prevent our weapon systems from becoming obsolete.  
However, now that relationships and timelines can be estimated, we can scientifically 
approach the problem of operational obsolescence.  I conclude from the information 
currently available and based on my expert opinion that we should make our initial 
attacks on the issue of logistical obsolescence, particularly as we field increasing 
technologically advanced systems that rely heavily on electronic components.  I 
recommend striving to develop a methodology that allows continuous refreshment of 
components over the life cycle of the weapon system through spares replacement, which 
can be continuously upgraded and modernized by our contractors.  This gives both the 
Army and industry the most competitive and capable environment in which to work and 
perform our mutually supportive and mutually dependent missions.   
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCHERS 
The life cycle of any weapon system commences not when the system is fielded, 
but from the moment that concept development commences.  Accordingly, our attack on 
obsolescence of any particular weapon system begins at the stage of conceptualization 
and initial design.  A better-designed weapon system is more robust with regard to 
obsolescence avoidance.  I did not perform any specific research on the impact of the 
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Department of Defense’s current efforts into Force Transformation, or the magnitude of 
the impact of the current pace of technology on acquisition cycles.  Nevertheless, it seems 
logical that these contemporary phenomena are significantly shortening the timeline for 
weapon system acquisition.  Accordingly, I recommend future study into the impact of 
accelerated procurement of evolving technology on weapons system obsolescence. 
There appears to be at least one major gain and at least one major concern that 
will occur with substantially shortened acquisition cycles.  In the past, we have often 
spent more than a decade to design, test, and field weapon systems.  This may have to be 
reduced to a period of three to five years in order to avoid the issues of logistical and 
technological obsolescence from the very time that the system is first fielded.  We are not 
sure about this conclusion at this point.  Given that this may be a plausible requirement, 
such a shortened acquisition timeline will tend to give our weapon systems the advantage 
of automatically containing newer technologies, which will demonstrate gains in the 
areas of logistical, economic, and technological obsolescence.  On the other hand, we 
must be cautious that as we shorten acquisition cycles we do not allow any degradation of 
standards in the engineering and testing of our weapons systems, which would lead to 
logistical and reliability problems after the weapons system is fielded.  This is an area 
that appears fertile for future research and examination.   
There are still many other questions that we must answer in an attempt to identify 
and combat operational obsolescence.  It was not feasible to answer all of the germane 
questions in a single thesis.  This thesis demonstrates how to solve many of these 
problems once data are collected and can be input into the models.  Other issues will 
require additional research.  My thesis sponsor, the Longbow Apache Project Manager, 
presented a number of the issues that follow as pertinent questions in the examination of 
operational obsolescence.  Among the most important of the remaining issues are the 
following: 
• Do we really need the most modern technologies to meet our National 
Defense objectives? 
• How much does it cost to implement one modernization plan versus 
another? 
• What are the chances that a truly revolutionary technological advancement 
will occur before we can fully reap the benefits of fielding a new system?  
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For example, an Aeronautical Engineering breakthrough that makes the 
use of rotary–wing aircraft impractical 
• If such a technology exists, how long will it take to mature and implement 
it? 
• Even if a new system is somewhat better than an existing system, from a 
Cost/Benefit perspective, do its acquisition and support costs justify its 
fielding versus the capabilities of current systems? 
• How accurately can we make our predictions concerning the relevance of 
a specific aircraft given a prescribed modernization plan? 
• Does the pace of technology cause existing systems to become 
operationally obsolete faster or slower than systems did in the past? 
• How much defensive, economic or moral value is there to continuing to 
modernize existing systems versus fielding new systems? 
• When we upgrade a current weapon system or its components for purely 
sustainment reasons, can we simultaneously gain a performance increase 
as a collateral benefit simply due to technological advances since the 
original system was designed?   
• What are the costs to gain added reliability in each sub-area of 
obsolescence for given types of weapon systems? 
• How does the weapon system actually improve with changes in reliability? 
• If we intend to modernize an existing weapon system at a future date, what 
are the costs associated with closing the current production line and then 
reopening it when the modernization effort commences? 
• For how long would it be more economically-feasible for the Army to pay 
the costs of maintaining a “warm production base” versus restarting a 
shut-down production line? 
 
Although there are still many questions that must be answered, I feel that through 
application of the techniques demonstrated in this thesis, we can make substantial 
improvements in our ongoing effort to minimize or eliminate operational obsolescence of 
our weapon systems.  This is a new area of study and much remains to be done.  By 
application of the scientific method, the military forces of the United States and our 
tremendous industrial base can be jointly mobilized to produce an ever increasingly 
relevant and ready force, transformed, and prepared for the twenty-first century and 
beyond. 
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APPENDIX A. BACKGROUND ON MODELS AND 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
A. LOCATION-SCALE DISTRIBUTIONS34 
 
As described in Chapter III, each of the sub-models and the resulting overall 
model are hazard function models derived from continuous distributions.  All of the 
distributions used further fall under the grouping of what is known as Location-Scale 
Distributions; hence the use of the one parameter to set the basic shape of the distribution 
and another to set the scale of the particular distribution. 
Any random variable, X, is said to belong to the location-scale family of 
distributions if its cumulative distribution function (cdf) can be expressed as: 
(A.1) Pr( ) ( ; , ) xX x F x µµ σ σ
− ≤ = = Φ    , 
where Φ  does not depend on any unknown parameters.  In such a case, we say that 
µ−∞ < < ∞  is a location parameter and that σ  > 0 is a scale parameter.  Upon 
substitution, we see that Φ is the cdf of X when µ  = 0 and σ  = 1.  Location-scale 
distributions are important for a number of reasons, including, but not limited to: 
• Many of the widely used statistical distributions are either location-scale 
distributions or closely related to them.  These distributions include the 
exponential, normal, Weibull, lognormal, loglogistic, logistic, and extreme 
value distributions. 
• Methods for data analysis and inference, statistical theory, and computer 
software developed for the location-scale family can be applied to any of 
the members of the family. 
• Theory for the location-scale distributions is relatively simple. 
 
In cases where Φ  does depend on one or more unknown parameters, X is not a 
member of the location-scale family, but the location-scale structure and notation will 
still be useful. 
                                                 
34  Wallace R. Blischke and D.N. Prabhakar Murthy, “Reliability Modeling, 
Prediction and Optimization,” Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, 2000, pp. 78-79. 
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A random variable Y belongs to the log-location-scale family of distributions if X 
= log(Y) is a member of the location-scale family.  The Weibull, lognormal, and 
loglogistic distributions are the most important members of this family; the logistic 
distribution is a member of the location-scale family. 
 
1. Weibull Distribution35 
 
The Weibull distribution cdf is generally written as: 
(A.2) Pr( ; , ) 1 exp , 0tT t t
β
η β η
  ≤ = − − >     
. 
For this parameterization, β  > 0 is a shape parameter and η > 0 is a scale 
parameter as well as being the 0.632 quantile.  The practical value of the Weibull 
distribution stems from its ability to describe virtually all failure distributions, with many 
different commonly occurring shapes.  When 0 < β < 1, the Weibull has a decreasing 
hazard function.  When β  > 1, the Weibull has an increasing hazard function.  At 
precisely β  = 1, the Weibull describes the exponential distribution.   
For any integer m > 0, 




( ) exp( )z z dzκκ
∞
−Γ = −∫  
is the gamma function.  From this we can see that the mean and variance of the Weibull 
distribution are: 
(A.5) E(T) = (1 + 1/ ) η βΓ  
and  
(A.6) 2 2Var(T) = [ (1 + 2/ ) - (1 + 1/ )].η β βΓ Γ  
The Weibull p-quantile is: 
(A.7) 1/pt = [-log(1 -p)] .
βη  
                                                 
35  Ibid, pp. 85-86. 
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Note that when β  = 1, the cdf reduces to the exponential distribution with scale 
parameter θ η= .   
 The relationship of the Weibull distribution to the location-scale family of 
distributions is found in the relationship between the Weibull and the Smallest Extreme 
Value distribution.  If T has a Weibull distribution, then log( ) ~ ( , ),Y T SEV µ σ= where 
1/σ β= is the scale parameter, and log( )µ η= is the location parameter.  The Weibull-
SEV relationship parallels the Lognormal-Normal relationship.  The SEV 
parameterization is often more convenient because location-scale distributions are easier 
to work with in general.  More detail on the SEV distribution can be found in Meeker and 
Escobar, 1998, pp. 83-85. 
The use of the Weibull distribution is often justified due to its ability to model 
failure-time data with either decreasing or increasing hazard functions.  Note that the 
Weibull described above is the two-parameter Weibull, as opposed to the three-parameter 
Weibull, which includes a translation parameter, γ .  Only the two-parameter Weibull 
was used in the production of this thesis. 
 
2. Lognormal Distribution36 
 
When T has a lognormal distribution, we show this by T ~ LOGNOR( ,µ σ ).  If T 
~ LOGNOR( ,µ σ ), then X = log(T) ~ NOR( ,µ σ ).  This relationship is the justification 
for the use of the lognormal in distributions of the location-scale family.  The lognormal 
cdf and pdf are: 
(A.8) log( )( ; , ) nor
tF t µµ σ σ
− = Φ    , 
and 
(A.9) 1 log( )( ; , ) , 0,nor
tf t t
t
µµ σ φσ σ
− = >    
                                                 
36  Ibid, pp. 82-83. 
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where norφ  and Φ nor are the pdf and cdf for the standardized normal.  The median, t.5 = 
exp( µ ) is a scale parameter and σ  > 0 is a shape parameter.   
The most common definition of the lognormal distribution uses base e, the 
natural, logarithms.  The definition of the parameters µ , the mean of the logarithm of T, 
andσ , the standard deviation of the logarithm of T, will depend on the base used.  For 
this reason, it is important to be consistent in the base used. 
For any integer m >0: 
(A.10) m 2 2E(T ) = exp(m  + m /2)µ σ  
It follows from this that the mean and variance of the lognormal distribution are: 
(A.11) 2E(T)=exp(  + 0.5 ) µ σ  
and  
(A.12) 2 2Var(T) = exp(2  + )[exp( ) - 1], µ σ σ respectively. 
The quantile function of the lognormal distribution is: 
(A.13) 1pt = exp[  + (p) ].norµ σ−Φ  
 
The lognormal distribution is a common model for failure times.  Following from 
the Central Limit Theorem, application of the lognormal distribution could be justified 
for a random variable that arises from the product of a number of identically distributed 
and independent positive random quantiles.  It has been suggested that the lognormal is 
an appropriate model for time to failure caused by a degradation process with 
combinations of random rate constants that combine multiplicatively.  The lognormal 
distribution is widely used to describe time to failure from fatigue crack growth in 
metals.37  The lognormal hazard function starts at 0, increases to some point in time, and 
then decreases, eventually to 0.  For σ  large, the hazard function reaches a maximum 
early and then decreases.  For this reason, the lognormal distribution is often used as a 
model for a population of electronic components that exhibits a decreasing hazard 
function.  It has been suggested that early-life “hardening” of certain kinds of materials or 
components might lead to such a hazard function.  The lognormal distribution also arises 
                                                 
37  Ibid, p. 83. 
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as the time to failure distribution of certain degradation processes.  The lognormal 
distribution shown here is the two-parameter distribution, as opposed to the three-
parameter, which includes a translation parameter, similar to the three-parameter 
Weibull, but which was not used in the production of this thesis. 
 
3. Logistic Distribution38 
 
When X has a logistic distribution, we show this by X ~ LOGIS( ,µ σ ).  The 
logistic distribution is a location-scale distribution with cdf, pdf, and hf: 
(A.14) logis( ; , ) ,
xF x µµ σ σ
− = Φ     
(A.15) logis
1( ; , ) ,xf x µµ σ φσ σ
− =     
(A.16) logis
1( ; , ) , ,xh x xµµ σ σ σ
− = Φ − ∞ < < ∞    
where Φ logis(z) = exp(z)/[1 + exp(z)] and φ logis(z) = exp(z)/[1 + exp(z)]2 are the cdf and 
pdf, respectively for a standardized LOGIS, with µ  = 0, and σ  = 1.  Here µ−∞ < < ∞ is 
a location parameter and σ  > 0 is a scale parameter.   
 For any integer m > 0: 
(A.17) ( ) 0mE X µ − =   
if m is odd, and 
(A.18) ( ) 1
1










     − = −           ∑  
if m is even.  From this: 






σ π  
The p quantile is: 
                                                 
38  Ibid, pp. 88-89.  
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(A1.21) -1logis ( ) ,pt pµ σ= + Φ  
where, 
 
(A1.22) [ ]-1logis ( ) log /(1 )p p pΦ = −  
is the p quantile of the standard logistic distribution. 
The shape of the logistic distribution is very similar to that of the normal 
distribution; the logistic distribution has slightly “longer tails.”  Indeed, it would require 
an extremely large number of observations to assess whether data came from a normal or 
logistic distribution.39  Because of this similarity, the Normal distribution, with 
appropriate parameters, was used in the BlockSim® model to represent the Logistic 
distribution.  BlockSim® did not allow the use of the Logistic distribution.  The main 
difference between the distributions is in the behavior of the hazard function in the upper 
tail of the distribution, where the logistic hf levels off, approaching 1/σ for large x.  This 
is the reason I chose to use the logistic distribution to model the hazard function for 
functional obsolescence.  For certain purposes, the logistic distribution is preferred to the 
normal because its cdf can be written in a simple closed form.  With modern software, 
however, it is not any more difficult to compute probabilities from a normal cdf. 
 
B. PRODUCTION OF HAZARD FUNCTION GRAPHS 
 
The hazard function graphs for each of the sub-types of operational obsolescence 
displayed in Chapter III are produced from the following S-Plus 2000® functions for the 
Weibull; Lognormal; and Logistic distributions, respectively.40 
 
1. Graph of the Weibull Hazard Function 
 
function(beta, eta, xlim = 100, n = 100) 
# This function calculates and plots the Hazard Function of the Weibull 
Distribution based on      
# user input parameters. 
{ 
                                                 
39  Ibid, p. 89. 
40  The assistance of Professor Samuel Buttrey in the production of these S-Plus® 
functions is gratefully acknowledged. 
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 x <- seq(1e-009, xlim, length = n) 
 one.minus.p <- 1 - pweibull(x, shape = beta, scale = eta) 
 y <- dweibull(x, shape = beta, scale = eta)/one.minus.p 
 thresh <- 1e-009 
 weibmean <- eta * gamma((1/beta) + 1) 
 weibmedian <- eta * ((log(2))^(1/beta)) 
 weibmode <- eta * ((1 - (1/beta))^(1/beta)) 
 if(any(one.minus.p < thresh)) { 
  warning(paste("Deleted", sum(one.minus.p < thresh),  
   "points")) 
  x <- x[one.minus.p >= thresh] 
  y <- y[one.minus.p >= thresh] 
 } 
 plot(x, y, type = "l", main = paste("Weibull with beta=",  
  beta, " and eta=", eta), xlab = "Time (Years)",  
  ylab = "h(t)") 
 mtext(paste("Mean: ", signif(weibmean, 5), " Median: ",  
  signif(weibmedian, 5), "Mode: ", signif(weibmode, 5 
  ))) 
} 
Figure A-1. Hazard Function based on the Weibull Distribution 
Figure A-1 gives the S-Plus® code for the production of the hazard function 
distribution, including its graph, for any model based on the Weibull Distribution 
with the user providing estimated parameters in the call statement to the function.  
Any modern statistical package could produce the graph and hazard function 
distribution following the example of the code found in the figure. 
 
 
2. Graph of the Lognormal Hazard Function 
 
function(mu, sigma, xlim = 100, ylim = 10, n = 100) 
# This function calculates and plots the Hazard Function of the Lognormal 
Distribution based on     # user input parameters. 
{ 
 x <- seq(1e-009, xlim, length = n) 
 one.minus.p <- 1 - plnorm(x, meanlog = mu, sdlog = sigma) 
 y <- dlnorm(x, meanlog = mu, sdlog = sigma)/one.minus.p 
 thresh <- 1e-009 
 lognormmean <- exp((mu + (sigma^2)/2)) 
 if(any(one.minus.p < thresh)) { 
  warning(paste("Deleted", sum(one.minus.p < thresh),  
   "points")) 
  x <- x[one.minus.p >= thresh] 
  y <- y[one.minus.p >= thresh] 
 } 
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 plot(x, y, type = "l", main = paste("Lognormal with mu=",  
  mu, " and sigma=", sigma), xlab = "Time (Years)",  
  ylab = "h(t)", ylim = c(0, ylim)) 
 mtext(paste("Mean: ", signif(lognormmean, 5))) 
} 
 
Figure A-2. Hazard Function based on the Lognormal Distribution 
Figure A-2 gives the S-Plus® code for producing the hazard function 
distribution and resulting graph for any model based on the Lognormal 
Distribution with the user providing estimated parameters in the call statement to 
the function.  Any modern statistical package could produce the graph and hazard 
function distribution following the example of the code found in the figure. 
 
 
3. Graph of the Logistic Hazard Function 
 
function(mu, sigma, xlim = 100, ylim = 10, n = 100) 
# This function calculates and plots the Hazard Function of the 
Logistic        # Distribution based on user input parameters. 
{ 
 x <- seq(1e-009, xlim, length = n) 
 one.minus.p <- 1 - plogis(x, location = mu, scale = sigma) 
 y <- dlogis(x, location = mu, scale = sigma)/one.minus.p 
 thresh <- 1e-009 
 logisticmean <- mu 
 logisticvar <- sigma^2 * (pi^2/3) 
 if(any(one.minus.p < thresh)) { 
  warning(paste("Deleted", sum(one.minus.p < thresh),  
   "points")) 
  x <- x[one.minus.p >= thresh] 
  y <- y[one.minus.p >= thresh] 
 } 
 plot(x, y, type = "l", main = paste("Logistic with mu=", 
  mu, " and sigma=", sigma), xlab = "Time (Years)", 
  ylab = "h(t)", ylim = c(0, ylim)) 
 mtext(paste("Mean: ", signif(logisticmean, 5),  
  "   Variance:  ", signif(logisticvar, 5))) 
} 
 
Figure A-3. Hazard Function based on the Logistic Distribution 
Figure A-3 gives the S-Plus® code for producing the hazard function 
distribution and resulting graph for any model based on the Logistic Distribution 
with the user providing estimated parameters in the call statement to the function.  
Any modern statistical package could produce the graph and hazard function 
distribution following the example of the code found in the figure. 
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APPENDIX B.  LIST OF ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS 
AMSAA – Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity 
CDF – Cumulative Distribution Function 
DMS – Diminishing Manufacturing Sources 
FCS – Future Combat System 
HF – Hazard Function 
IOC  - Initial Operational Capability 
LHA – Light Helicopter Amphibious Ship used by the U.S. Marine Corps 
LRM – Line-Replaceable Module 
LRU- Line-Replaceable Unit 
MBT – Main Battle Tank 
MTBF – Mean Time Between Failures 
MY – Multi-Year, as in Block Purchase Contract 
O & S – Operations and Sustainment 
OPTEMPO – Operations Tempo 
OSA – Open Systems Architecture 
OT&E - Operational Testing and Evaluation 
PDF – Probability Distribution Function  
PIP – Product Improvement Program 
PEO – Program Executive Officer 
PM - Project Manager 
SEV – Smallest Extreme Value 
SRU – Shop-Replaceable-Unit 
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